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THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS IN VIRGINIA V.
BLACK
INTRODUCTION

In 1998, a group of men in Virginia Beach, Virginia, burned a
homemade, wooden cross on a black family's lawn.' The vengeful act

2
put the family in fear of what would happen next. The family called the
police, which led to the arrest and conviction of two men under the
state's law against cross burning. 3 However, the convictions were subsequently vacated by the Virginia Supreme Court because the crossburning statute was found unconstitutional.4 Attempts to construct constitutional cross-burning regulations are commendable, but unfortunately
for proponents, First Amendment jurisprudence has often posed an insurmountable obstacle.5 In 2003, however, the United States Supreme
Court, in Virginia v. Black, cleared some of the historical roadblocks by
6
allowing states to prohibit cross burning with intent to intimidate.
Though seemingly recognizing the harms associated with cross burning,
the Black ruling itself raises constitutional concerns and is not as laudable as it may appear. First, the ruling confuses the method of analysis on
viewpoint discrimination. Second, the ruling contradicts the Court's earlier decision of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.7 In light of Black's recognition
of a harm, there may still be a way to limit cross burning without burden8
ing speech protected under the First Amendment. Thus, this Comment
discusses the practical and precedential dilemma created by the Black
holding and offers a constitutional answer to the evident problem of
cross burning.

Part I of this Comment discusses the facts leading up to the Black
decision. Part II outlines the analysis of speech under the First Amendment and explains the exceptions to constitutionally protected speech.
Part II also illustrates the strong link between cross burning and the Ku
Klux Klan. Finally, Part II outlines the Court's decision in R.A.V., an
I. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Va. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part
sub nom. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1543.
2.
O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Va. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, Black v.
3.
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), affid in part, vacated in part sub noma. Virginia v.
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
Black, 553 S.E.2d at 740, 746.
4.
5.
See Rodney A. Smolla, Terrorism and the Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
551, 569-70 (2002).
6.
7.
8.

Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541. The Court invalidated the Virginia statute on other grounds. Id.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
See Smolla, supra note 5, at 570.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1

important prelude to the Black decision. Part III discusses the Black decision itself, including concurring and dissenting opinions. Part IV suggests that the Supreme Court's method of analysis in Black was incorrect, and that the Court's decision on viewpoint discrimination is inconsistent with precedent. Part IV then proposes a constitutional answer to
the problem of cross burning. Finally, Part IV argues that proscribing
cross burning under existing laws, rather than under specific crossburning regulations, would accomplish the dual goals of punishing those
who burn crosses to intimidate others, and preserving free speech under
the First Amendment.
I. FACTS

Under Virginia's cross-burning statute, it was unlawful "for any
person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place." 9 The statute also established that
"[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent
to intimidate ...

."t0 Richard Elliot, Jonathan O'Mara and Barry Elton

Black were each convicted separately of violating the Virginia statute,
and each challenged its constitutionality."
A. Richard Elliot & Jonathan O'Mara
On May 2, 1998, two of the defendants, Elliot and O'Mara, attempted to burn a cross on the property of James Jubilee, Elliot's nextdoor neighbor.' 2 The defendants' alleged motivation for burning the
cross was revenge.' 3 Before the cross burning, Jubilee questioned Elliot's4
mother about gun shots he heard fired from behind the Elliot home.'
Elliot's mother informed the neighbor that shooting firearms was a
hobby of her son's. 5 On the night of May 2, the defendants and another
individual made a wooden cross and took it to Jubilee's property.16 Elliot
gave the cross to O'Mara, who set the cross on fire.' 7 While taking the
cross to Jubilee's home, Elliot called Jubilee a racial epithet.' 8 Jubilee, an
African-American, said he was "very nervous" when he saw the burned
cross on his property the next morning.' 9 The defendants were not affili-

9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
Id.
Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1541 (2003).
Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1542-43.
Id. at 1543.
Id. The respondents, Elliot and O'Mara, saw this questioning as a complaint by Jubilee.

Id.
15.
Id.
16.
O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
17.
O'Mara, 535 S.E.2d at 177.
18. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Va. 2001).
19.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542-43. Jubilee said he "didn't know what would be the next phase,"
and "a cross burned in your yard ... tells you that it's just the first round." Id. at 1543.
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ated with the Klan.20 At trial, O'Mara pleaded guilty to attempted cross
2
burning, 2'and Elliot was convicted by a jury of the same charge.2 2
B. Barry Elton Black
On August 22, 1998, the third defendant, Black, headed a Ku Klux
Klan rally where a cross was burned as part of the ceremony.2 3 The rally
and the cross burning occurred on private property but within sight of a
public highway.24 The county sheriff observed the rally from the side of
the road and reported that a few cars out of the forty or fifty that passed
the site stopped and inquired about the activity on the property. 25 In addition, Rebecca Sechrist, who lived in the area, watched the rally from her
in-laws' yard.26 Sechrist testified that the content of Klan members'
speeches during the rally made her "very ...scared. 27 At the end of the
rally, the Klan members burned a twenty-five to thirty foot cross, an
event that Sechrist said "made her feel 'awful' and 'terrible."' 28 When
the sheriff saw the cross burning, he approached the rally attendees and
asked those gathered "who was responsible for burning the cross.' 2 9
Black claimed responsibility and was arrested by the sheriff.3 ° At trial,
Black was convicted of burning a cross with intent to intimidate under
the Virginia statute. 3 '
II.BACKGROUND

A. The FirstAmendment
The First Amendment 32 concept of free speech is based on the principle that all ideas, even the offensive and distasteful, should be heard.33
"Speech," in the context of this freedom, is not limited to the spoken
word. 34 Courts have established that the First Amendment also guaranId. at 1543.
20.
Id. O'Mara also pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy to commit cross burning. Id.
21.
Elliot was acquitted on that charge. Id.
Id. Each respondent was sentenced to ninety days in jail and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine.
22.
Id. In O'Mara's case, the judge suspended forty-five days of the sentence and $1,000 of the fine. id.
Id. at 1542.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
27.
Id.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
30. Id.
Id. Black was sentenced to a fine of $2,500. Id.
31.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
33. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003) (citing Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
34. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at
406).
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tees freedom of expression, which is conduct that contains an element of
communication.35 For example, wearing black armbands to protest the
Vietnam war 36 and desecrating an American flag 37 are forms of expression. On the other hand, some conduct is considered non-expressive. In
deciding whether an action is protected under the First Amendment,
courts must determine whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message was present, and [whether] in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it."'38 Most agree that cross burning is considered speech because
although setting a cross on fire is conduct, the purpose of burning a cross
is to convey a message.3 9
Freedom of speech is not absolute. 4° There are several categories of
speech that are considered unprotected by the First Amendment, such as
obscenity, 4' "fighting words" 42 and "true threats." 43 The government
may limit speech in these categories without violating the First Amendment.44 These categories are considered constitutionally proscribable
because they are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.A 5 In other words, society is not
harmed by the suppression of such speech. Fighting words are those that
"by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace."' 6 Fighting words are unprotected speech because
they are not considered an essential part of the expression of ideas.47
True threats are also unprotected. 48 A true threat is a communication that
expresses an "intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." 49 For exam-

35. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
36. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
37. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
38. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974).
39. See Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1548. There has been some controversy about whether burning a
cross is speech or conduct for the purposes of the Virginia cross-burning statute. See id. at 1548 n.2.
For example, Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Black, argues that the legislative intent behind the
Virginia statute was to end intimidation, not to end the expression of a white supremacist ideology.
Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For this reason, he argues, the statute limits conduct, not expression, and therefore does not enjoy First Amendment protection. Id.
40. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (citing Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931), Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937), Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940)).
41.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
42.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
43.
Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1547 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
44.
Chaplinskv, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
45.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (quoting Chaplinskv, 315 U.S. at 572).
46.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
47.
Id.
48.
Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1547 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
49.
Id. at 1548.
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pie, a threat directed at a person with intent to put that person in fear of
bodily harm is a true threat.5 °
Although the government may limit or completely prohibit speech
fitting into the categories discussed above, the government may not limit
speech based on viewpoint. 5' In other words, regulating speech based on
one content element-the fact that it contains obscenity--does not mean
it can be limited based on other content elements.52 Limitations on
speech generally are required to be content-neutral to ensure that the
government does not use its power to silence speech on disfavored topics. 53 Content discrimination "'raises the specter that the Government
may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.' 5 4 Thus, content-based limitations are presumptively invalid.55
And, although the government may limit obscenity as a category, it must
limit obscenity in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 56 For example, the government may prohibit obscenity on television, but the government may
not only prohibit obscenities aimed at the government, thereby favoring a
pro-government viewpoint.5 7
There are two exceptions to the prohibition of viewpoint discrimination within a category of proscribable speech.58 First, regulations may be
based on viewpoint when the basis for the "discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable
.... ,59 The idea behind this exception is that, if the reason for the subcategory limitation is the same as the reason for the category limitation,
there is no danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination.6 ° In other words,
the reason for the categorical limitation has already been deemed neutral,
so if a sub-category is limited for the same reason, it follows that the subcategory limitation is neutral as well. 6 1 For example, the government
6
may limit obscenity that is "most patently offensive in its prurience 2
because the reason the entire category of obscenity is proscribable is
because it appeals to the prurient interest.63 A second exception to the
general prohibition of viewpoint discrimination exists within a category
of proscribable speech when the regulation focuses only on "secondary

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,

502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 382.
See id. at 385-86.
See id. at 384.
See id. at 388-89.
Id. at 388.
Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
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effects" of the speech rather than the content of the speech. 64 For example, the government may prohibit adult theaters in certain neighborhoods
if the focus of the limitation is not on the content of the entertainment but
on the effect such entertainment would have on the surrounding community. 65 Viewpoint discrimination within these exceptions is constitutional
because such discrimination does not present the threat of governmental
suppression of ideas.66
The distinction between content-neutral and content-based limitation matters because regulations of speech in each category must pass
different levels of scrutiny. 67 Content-neutral limitations of speech in
generally unprotected categories must satisfy only intermediate scrutiny. 68 In analyzing content-neutral limitations, courts consider whether
the regulation is narrowly tailored to satisfy a legitimate and substantial
government interest. 69 On the other hand, content-based limitations, even
within categories of traditionally unprotected speech, must pass strict
scrutiny.7 ° Strict scrutiny requires that limitations on speech be narrowly
tailored to achieving a compelling government interest.7 1 Content-based
limitations must pass a higher level of scrutiny because, in those instances, it is more likely that the government is trying to suppress ideas. 72
One criticism of the method of analysis described above is that less valued speech that fits under an exception ends up being treated the same as
high-level speech.73 For example, fighting words, which are considered
valueless, are on "equal constitutional footing" with political speech,
which has the greatest social value. 74
If nothing else is clear in the tangle of First Amendment jurisprudence, the constitutionality of any speech regulation turns largely on the
Court's interpretation of a regulation as content-based or content-neutral.
B. Cross Burning in the United States
Cross burning has a long, disturbing history in the United States,
one which is historically and permanently linked with the Ku Klux
Klan. 75 The Klan promotes white supremacy and uses a burning cross to
64.

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986)).

65.

See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.

66. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
67. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
68.
TurnerBroad., 512 U.S. at 642.
69.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) ("[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
70.
TurnerBroad., 512 U.S. at 642.
71.
R.A.V., 505 U.S at 400.
72.
TurnerBroad., 512 U.S. at 642.
73.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 403 (White, J., concurring).
74.
Id.
75.
See, e.g., Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544-45.

SHORTCOMINGS OF VIRGINIA V. BLACK

2003]

carry out and symbolize that goal.76 As one Klan publication noted, "We
avow the distinction between races, . . . and we shall ever be true to the

faithful maintenance of White Supremacy and will strenuously oppose
any compromise thereof in any and all things. 77 In fact, the association
between cross burning and the Klan was solidified with the release of the
movie The Birth of a Nation in 1915.78 In the movie, Klan members
burned a cross to celebrate the execution of former slaves. 79 The ritual of
cross burning is "strongly associated with bigotry and violence. 8 ° Cross
burnings are often followed by property damage, threatening phone calls,
shootings, and bombings. 8' Historically, the Klan's victims have included blacks and other minorities, as well as whites who disagree with
the Klan's message.8 2 Whether directed toward a group or an individual,
a burning cross "understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear
of physical violence. 83
However, a burning cross is also a symbol of ideology and solidarity and has become the climax of Klan rallies and initiations. 84 The act is
often accompanied by a hymn, such as "Amazing Grace" or "The Old
Rugged Cross. 85 In 1960, a burning cross was even used by the Klan as
propaganda.8 6 In an attempt to recruit ten million members, the Klan
circulated a poster depicting a burning cross.87 Additionally, there have
been cases where individuals who were not associated with the Klan
used a burning cross to intimidate another individual. 88 This method of
intimidation was chosen because of the association between a burning
cross and violence.89

76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 1545 (quoting WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN

AMERICA 147-48 (1987)).

78.

Id. at 1544-45. The movie, directed by D.W. Griffith, was based on the book: THOMAS

DIXON, JR., THE CLANSMAN: AN HISTORICAL ROMANCE OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN (1905). Black, 123

S. Ct. at 1544-45. The book and movie portrayed Klan members as heroes. Id. at 1544. Around the
time The Birth of a Nation was made, the second Klan formed. Id. at 1545. The first Klan, which
began in 1866, started as a social club and then became a force against Reconstruction and against
allowing freed blacks to be part of the political process. Id. at 1544. The Klan's violence included
whippings, threats, and murder. Id. (citing to WADE, supra note 77, at 48-49). In response, Congress
passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1988)), which was used to suppress the Klan's activities. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544. By
1877, the first Klan ceased to exist. Id.
79. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544; see also WADE, supra note 77, at 324-26.
80.
Smolla, supra note 5, at 568.
81.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1564 n. I (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1544.
83.
Id. at 1564 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1546.
85.
Smolla, supra note 5, at 568.
86. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1546.
87.

Id.

88.
89.

See id.
See id. at 1546-47.
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The history of cross burning supports the conclusion that a burning
cross is a serious threat and the possibility of injury or death is real. 90 The
great social harm of intimidation from cross burnings has prompted
many states, including Virginia, to pass laws specifically prohibiting
cross burning. 91 The first version of Virginia's cross-burning statute was
prompted by incidents of cross burning after WWI. 92 The governor
pledged that he would "not allow any of our people of any race to be
subjected to terrorism or intimidation in any form by the Klan.. .. "93
Though Virginia's most recent cross-burning statute was at issue in
Black,94 the case was not the Court's first opportunity to consider the
constitutionality of states' regulation of cross burning. A decade before
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Virginia's
cross-burning statute, the Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that punished cross burning and other hate speech.95 The opinion declaring the
Minnesota statute unconstitutional was an important precursor to the
Black decision.
C. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
The St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance at issue in R.A.V. declared it
unlawful to display a symbol one knows or has reason to know "arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender .... ,,96 The defendant in R.A.V., along with several
other teenagers, allegedly burned a cross in a neighbor's yard.97 The
cross, made out of broken chair legs, was burned on the lawn of a black
family living across the street from the defendant.9 8 The defendant,
charged under St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,99 claimed the
ordinance was overbroad, impermissibly content-based and, therefore,
facially unconstitutional. 1 ° The trial court agreed and dismissed the
charges.101
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 10 2 The state supreme court
found that, by limiting its reach to fighting words, the ordinance was not

90.
Id. at 1546.
91.
See, e.g., Mark S. Enslin, Domestic Terrorism or Protected Free Speech: The Supreme
Court Decides the Cross-Burning Question in Black v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), 26
HAMLINE L. REV. 178, 193-98 (2002).

92.

Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1545.

93.
Id. (quoting DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE Ku
KLUX KLAN 333 (1981)).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1541.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 290.02 (1990)).
Id. at 379.
Id.
ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 290.02 (1990).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380.
Id.
In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991).
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03
overbroad.1
In other words, the expression covered by the ordinance
was outside of First Amendment protection.' °4 Further, the Minnesota
Supreme Court said the ordinance served a compelling state interest in
protecting society
from threats and, therefore, was not impermissibly
05
content-based.1

1. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to R.A.V. and
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court decision. 06 The United States
Supreme Court found the ordinance impermissibly content-based and,
therefore, facially unconstitutional.' 0 7 The Court recognized that it was
bound by the state supreme court's interpretation of the ordinance, which
limited the ordinance's reach to fighting words, 0 8 a constitutionally unprotected category of speech. 0 9 However, the Court reasoned that the
ordinance prohibited fighting words based on their content, banning only
those fighting words that provoked violence on the basis of race, color,
creed, etc." 0 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that the ordinance did not prohibit bias-motivated messages directed at other groups,
such as homosexuals."' In short, the Court determined that the First
Amendment did not permit the government to "impose special prohibi'
tions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." 12
Further, the Court found that the ordinance not only discriminated
based on content, but discriminated based on viewpoint as well." 3 The
Court explained that the ordinance would allow fighting words that did
not invoke race to be used by proponents of racial equality, but perhaps
not by opponents of racial equality.' 14
Finally, the Court found that the St. Paul ordinance did not fit under
any exception allowing viewpoint discrimination within an area of proscribable speech.' '5 The R.A. V. Court articulated two exceptions to the
general rule that regulation cannot discriminate based on viewpoint, even
within otherwise proscribable categories of speech. 1 6 Under the Court's

103.

R.A.V.,464N.W.2dat511.

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.

Id.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
Id. at 381.

108.

Id.

109.

Id. at 386.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
See id.at 393.
Id. at 388-89.
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be considered viewpoint discrimination
exceptions, what would normally
17
becomes viewpoint neutral.'
The first instance is "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable .... ,,18 According to the Court, the St. Paul ordinance did
not fit under this exception because St. Paul did not prohibit only the
most threatening fighting words." 19 Rather, the St. Paul ordinance prohibited fighting words based on their message. 20 The second instance is
when the subclass of proscribable speech is regulated based on its "secondary effects."' 2' The St. Paul ordinance did not fit under this exception
because the prohibition of fighting words was to protect victimization ' of
effects."' 23
vulnerable people. 2 2 Listeners' reactions are not "secondary
24
In R.A.V., the ordinance was aimed at primary effects.1
Lastly, the Court briefly described an additional situation where
proscribable speech may be limited based on content-when "the nature
of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot."'' 25 The Minnesota statute did
because there was
not fit under this exception, according to the Court,
"ample basis" for a suspicion of idea suppression.126
After finding the regulation was content-based, the Court next, under the rubric of strict scrutiny, rejected St. Paul's contention that the
ordinance's alleged content discrimination was justified because the ordinance served a compelling state interest. 2 7 The Court declined to accept St. Paul's explanation, finding instead that a compelling interest is
only valid where the ordinance is necessary to serve the compelling state
interest. 28 The Court found that, although ensuring the basic human
rights of people subject to discrimination was a compelling interest, the
ordinance was not necessary to serve the interest. 29 More specifically,
the Court noted that content-neutral alternatives existed, making content
discrimination not "reasonably necessary" to serve St. Paul's compelling
interest.130

117.
118.

Id.at 388.
Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 393-94.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 394.
Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
Id. at 394 n.7.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 395 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
Id. 395-96.
Id.
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2. The Concurring Opinion
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the outcome
of the majority-that the ordinance was unconstitutional-but under
different reasoning.' 3' Justice White criticized the majority for adopting
an "untried theory," and for finding the ordinance unconstitutional on "a
ground that requires serious departures from the teaching of prior cases.
S. .,,32 In short, Justice White believed the majority unnecessarily rewrote First Amendment law. 133 Justice White noted that the R.A.V. decision abandoned the traditional categorical approach to the First Amendment, putting in its place a great inconsistency. 34 For example, Justice
White explained that fighting words are categorically proscribable, but
under the 1majority
opinion, some fighting words deserve constitutional
35
protection.
Justice White argued instead that the Minnesota ordinance was fa136
cially unconstitutional under the traditional doctrine of overbreadth.
Justice White explained that the statute was overbroad because it limited
protected speech in addition to unprotected speech. 37 Justice White further argued that the Court ignored strict scrutiny analysis as if it were
irrelevant. 38 Had the Court considered strict scrutiny analysis, Justice
White explained, it would
have found a compelling state interest in re39
stricting hate speech. 1
With these issues in mind, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether Virginia's cross-burning statute was constitutional.
III. VIRGINIA V. BLACK
A. ProceduralHistory
The two defendants who burned a cross on the lawn of a neighborO'Mara and Elliot- unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of
the Virginia cross-burning statute at trial. 40 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed O'Mara's and Elliot's convictions under Virginia's crossburning statute and rejected the defendants' contention that the statute
was an impermissible infringement on expression and "plainly unconsti131.
Id. at 411 (White, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 398 (White, J., concurring). In fact, Justice White noted that the ground on which
the Minnesota ordinance was found unconstitutional by the majority was not even presented to the
Court, nor was it briefed by the parties. Id.
133. Id. at 411 (White, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring).
135.

Id.

136. Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 403 (White, J., concurring).
139.
Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring). In fact, as Justice White pointed out, the majority did
concede that there was compelling interest in ensuring human rights of people who have been discriminated against. Id. at 403 (White, J., concurring).
140.
O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8 1:1

tutional.,' 4 1 The court interpreted the statute as proscribing true threats
and fighting words, categories of speech not protected by the First
Amendment. 42 The Virginia Court of Appeals distinguished the Virginia
statute from the ordinance in R.A.V.143 The court said that although the
R.A.V. ordinance proscribed fighting words, such proscribable areas of
speech could not be made "the vehicles for content discrimination...
. 144 Therefore, the court explained, although the cross-burning statute
"unavoidably implicates content," it did not do so "'solely on the basis of
the subjects the speech addresses ...., The Virginia Court of Appeals also determined that the statute was neither overbroad nor underinclusive, as the defendants had contended.146 The other defendant, Black,
who burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally, was convicted under the
Virginia cross-burning statute. 147 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed Black's conviction.148
The Virginia Supreme Court consolidated the cases of O'Mara and
Elliot with the Black case and found the Virginia statute facially unconstitutional. 49 The court agreed with the defendants' contention that the
statute prohibited speech based on content. 5 ° The court found that the
Virginia statute was indistinguishable from the statute in R.A.V., which
the United States Supreme Court previously had found unconstitutional. 15' Although the Virginia statute did not mention content in the
same way as the R.A.V. statute, the Virginia statute specifically mentioned cross burning.' 52 The fact that the statute regulated cross burning,
and not other forms of intimidation, was evidence that the Commonwealth's purpose for enacting the statute was to limit expression: "[T]he
Commonwealth seeks to proscribe expressive conduct that is intimidatchooses only cross burning because of its
ing in nature, but selectively
' 53
distinctive message." 1
In keeping with R.A. V., the Virginia Supreme Court next considered
whether the Virginia statute regulated speech and expression based on
O'Mara, 535 S.E.2d at 177.
141.
Id. at 179.
142.
143.
Id. at 179-80.
144.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179-80 (quoting R.A.v. v. Commonwealth, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992)).
145.
Id. at 180-81.
146.
147.
Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 741 (Va. 2001).
Black, 553 S.E.2d at 741.
148.
Id. at 740.
149.
150.
Id. at 744.
151.
Id. at 742-43.
152.
Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (where it was unlawful "for any
person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place"), with ST. PAUL,
MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 290.02 (1990) (where, under this "Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance," it was
unlawful to display a symbol one knew or had reason to know caused "anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender").
153.
Black, 553 S.E.2d at 743-44.

20031

SHORTCOMINGS OF VIRGINIA V. BLACK

"secondary effects."' 154 When a statue regulates the secondary effects of
constitutionally proscribable speech, the statute is considered contentneutral. 55 However, the court found that because the Virginia statute
focused on expressive conduct--cross burning-and included a provision allowing an inference of intent to intimidate, the statute did not
regulate secondary effects and, therefore, was impermissibly content156
based.
The Virginia Supreme Court additionally found that the statute was
overbroad because of the increased probability of prosecution due to the
evidence provision, which made57the act of burning a cross prima facie
evidence of intent to intimidate.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
consolidated cases of Richard Elliot, Jonathan O'Mara, and Barry Elton
Black. 58 The Court focused on two issues: (1) whether the Virginia
cross-burning statute was impermissibly content-based; and (2) whether
the prima facie evidence provision invalidated the statute. 59
B. The Court's Holding
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, in part, with Virginia
Supreme Court, finding that the Virginia statute was viewpoint neutral. 160
The Supreme Court agreed, however, that the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute unconstitutional.' 61 The analysis section of
this Comment focuses on the concept of viewpoint discrimination and
the Court's analysis of that issue. However, the Court's finding as to the
prima facie evidence provision was essential to the ruling and is therefore discussed briefly at the end of this section. 62 Justice O'Connor
wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Breyer on the issue of viewpoint discrimination. 161

154. Id. at 745.
155. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986)).
156. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 745.
157. Id. at 746.
158. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1543 (2003).
159. See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 154 1.
160. See id. at 1549.
161.
Id. at 1541.
162. See infra Part III.B.2.
163.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541. Justice Scalia did not join the other four Justices of the majority
on the issue of the prima facie evidence provision, making the Court's opinion regarding that provision a plurality. Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1. The Majority Opinion Regarding Viewpoint Discrimination
The Court determined that Virginia's ban on cross burning with intent to intimidate did not present a First Amendment problem.'6564 There
were essentially three steps to the Court's analysis of this issue. 1
First, the Court recognized that cross burning was a type of "true
threat."' 166 True threats constitute a category of constitutionally unprotected speech, meaning the government may limit or ban threats of violence. 67 The Court defined true threats as "statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals."'168 The Court reasoned that intimidation is a type of true threat and
cross burning fits within the meaning of intimidation. 69 In other words,
to intimidate within a category
the Court placed cross burning with intent
70
of constitutionally proscribable speech.
Second, the Court decided that Virginia's cross-burning statute was
viewpoint neutral because the statute prohibited all cross burnings with
intent to intimidate, regardless of the actor's message.' 7' For example,
the Virginia statute did not specifically ban cross burnings motivated by
race or religion. 172 The Court distinguished the Virginia statute from the
statute in R.A.V. on this characteristic. '73 The statute in R.A.V. banned
symbolic conduct, such as cross burning, when done with knowledge that
the conduct would cause anger, alarm, or resentment "on the basis of
74 The Court reasoned that the
race, color, creed, religion or gender .... ,1
R.A.V. statute discriminated on the basis of content because it regulated
expression only on certain disfavored topics, but did not, for example,
prohibit symbolic conduct that could cause anger based on political affiliation or sexual orientation. 75 Conversely, the Virginia statute prohibited all cross burnings done with intent to intimidate and did not permit
cross burnings only when the speech exthe state to selectively regulate
76
pressed disfavored views.'

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1549.
See id. at 1548-49.
Id. at 1548.
See id.
Id.
Id.

170.

See id.

Id. at 1549.
171.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (It was unlawful "for any person or per172.
sons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a
cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.").
See Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1548-49.
173.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 308 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
174.
175.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548.
176.
Id. at 1549.
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The Court's third step focused on the R.A.V. exceptions.' 7 7 The
Court analyzed the statute under the exceptions to the general rule that
content-based regulation within categories of proscribable speech is prohibited.11 8 The relevant exception, the Court determined, was the socalled "virulence exception."'' 79 The virulence exception, established in
R.A. V., applies where the underlying reason for the regulation is the reason why the entire category of speech is proscribable.180 The Court explained that cross burning is a particularly virulent form of intimidation-a form of intimidation "most likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm"-and, therefore, fit under the exception.' 8' In other words, based
on the history of cross burning, when a cross is burned with intent to
intimidate, the act is one of the worst types of intimidation. 82 Therefore,
the Court said, Virginia may regulate this "subset of intimidating messages" just as the state may regulate the most prurient material in the
83
category of obscenity.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Virginia Supreme Court's viewpoint analysis but agreed with the Virginia Supreme
Court that the statute was unconstitutional. 184 The United States Supreme
Court invalidated the statute on the prima facie evidence provision. 85
2. The Plurality Opinion 86 Regarding the Prima Facie Evidence
Provision
After noting that the Virginia Supreme Court had not yet ruled on
the meaning of the prima facie evidence provision in the cross-burning
statute, 187 the Court analyzed the provision as interpreted by the state's
jury instruction.188 The Court found the provision unconstitutional because it "strips away the very reason why a State may ban cross burning
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 1549-50.
Id.
Id. at 1549-50.
Id. at 1549 (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
Id. at 1549-50.

182.

See id.

183. Id. at 1549.
184. Id. at 1541, 1549.
185. Id. at 1541.
186.
See discussion supra note 163 and accompanying text.
187.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996) (stating that "[a]ny such burning of a cross
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate").
188.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1550. The jury instruction was used only at defendant Black's trial.
Id.
In Elliot and O'Mara's case, the judge instructed the jury that the commonwealth must
prove: (1)
intent to commit cross burning; (2) a direct act toward the commission of the crime; and
(3) that the
intent of the defendant was to intimidate a person or group of persons. Id. at 1543. The
judge did not
inform the jury about the prima facie evidence part of the statute. Id. In Black's case,
the judge did
instruct the jury on the definition of intent to intimidate and the prima facie evidence provision.
Id. at
1542. The jury was instructed that intent to intimidate means "the motivation to intentionally
put a
person or group of persons in fear of bodily harm. Such fear must arise from the willful
conduct of
the accused rather than from some mere temperamental timidity of the victim." Id. Further,
the jury
was told that "the burning of a cross by itself is sufficient evidence from which you
may infer the
required intent." Id.
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with the intent to intimidate."' 89 The Court went on to explain that the
provision allowed a jury to convict in every case where a defendant exercised his right to not put on a defense.' 90 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that the provision increased the likelihood that intent to intimidate will be
found within the facts of a case.' 9' The Court stated that the provision
chilled constitutionally protected speech because it was more likely that a
person engaging in political speech would be prosecuted and convicted
under the statute: "The prima facie provision . ..does not distinguish
between a cross burning done with the purpose of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done with the purpose of threatening or
intimidating a victim.' 92 Based on the fear that jury decisions would be
skewed toward convictions, the Court found the provision unconstitutional. 93 The Court ended its opinion with a disclaimer, recognizing that
the Virginia Supreme Court may interpret the provision94 differently and
that the possibility exists that the provision is severable.
C. Concurringand Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that a state may ban cross
burning with intent to intimidate without infringing on the First Amendment. 195 He disagreed, however, with the facial invalidation of the Virginia statute based on the evidence provision. 96 Justice Scalia argued
that the Court was not justified in finding the Virginia statute overbasing its decision on a "constitutionally troubling" jury
broad 197 or in
98
instruction.
Justice Scalia explained that the prima facie evidence provision, a
mere inference, did not give the prosecution so large an advantage to
render the statute substantially overbroad. 199 Based on the orthodox
meaning of prima facie evidence, which was adopted by Virginia, prima
facie evidence is evidence that may establish a fact only if it goes unre-

189. Id. at 1550.
190. Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id. at 1551.
193.
Id. The majority agreed with Justice Souter's opinion and stated "that the prima facie
evidence provision can 'skew jury deliberations toward conviction in cases where the evidence of
intent to intimidate is relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for
burning."' Id. (quoting id. at 1561 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
194.
Id. at 1552.
Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195.
Id.
196.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197.
Id. at 1554 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1556-58 (Scalia, J.,
198.
Id. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). When a statute regulates
199.
expression, it is not overbroad unless the overbreadth is "'not only real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' Id. at 1556 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990)).
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butted. 200 The Virginia Supreme Court found that the evidence provision
insulated "'the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the evidence at
the end of its case-in-chief,"' and nothing more.20 ' Justice Scalia argued
that those defendants who choose not to put on a defense are in the minority.202 In other words, the possibility of conviction did not render the
statute overbroad and, therefore, did not warrant facial invalidation.2 °3
Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for invalidating an ambiguous
statute based on a constitutionally questionable jury instruction.2° The
Court, he said, should have followed precedent and given a saving construction of the statute.20 5
2. Justice Souter's Opinion
Justice Souter agreed with the Court's discussion of content-based
discrimination in the context of the Virginia statute.20 6 However, Justice
Souter argued that the statute did not fit within any of the exceptions to
R.A.V.'s "general condemnation of limited content-based proscription
within a broader category of expression proscribable generally. 2 7 In
order to prove this assertion, Justice Souter analyzed the statute under the
most probable of the R.A. V. exceptions-the virulence exception-which
provided that content discrimination is allowable when the basis for the
discrimination is the reason the entire category of speech is proscribable.20 8 In R.A.V., the Court offered examples of the virulence excetion-threats against the president and unusually offensive obscenity.
These two examples are situations in which a subcategory of proscribable speech may be regulated.21 ° Justice Souter distinguished these examples from cross burning, arguing that unlike cross burning, the examples given in R.A. V. did not single out a particular viewpoint. 21 1 Because
the Virginia statute did not fit under any exception, Justice Souter explained, it could survive only if it served a compelling state interest, a
strict test the statute failed.21 2
Justice Souter agreed with the Court that the prima facie evidence
provision would increase the likelihood of conviction and was therefore
unconstitutional: "To the extent the prima facie evidence provision

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

ld. at 1553 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (quoting Black, 553 S.E.2d at 746).
Id. at 1555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1557-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 1559-60 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1560-61(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1560 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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skews prosecutions, then, it skews the statute toward suppressing
ideas."2 3
3. Justice Thomas's Opinion
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that cross burning, for the purposes of the Virginia statute, should have been classified as conduct, not
expression, and, therefore, should not have been considered under the
First Amendment.21 4 Justice Thomas supported his argument with a discussion of the progression of the meaning of cross burning in the United
States: "Because the modem Klan expanded the list of its enemies ... to
include Catholics, Jews, most immigrants, and labor unions .... a burn-

ing cross is now widely viewed as a signal of impending terror and lawlessness. 215
However, Justice Thomas's primary disagreement with the plurality
was that, in his view, the prima facie evidence provision did not present a
constitutional problem. 216 The evidence provision was valid, Justice
Thomas explained, because an inference is rebuttable, and the jury in2 7
structions still required the jury to establish each element of the statute.
to an inference
Moreover, he wrote, the risk of chilled expression due
had not been of much concern to the Court in the past.2t 8
IV. ANALYSIS
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued two major decisions on the effect of content discrimination within a category of constitutionally unprotected speech.21 9 In R.A.V., the Court found that the government could not limit unprotected speech based on viewpoint unless
the limitation fit within an exception. 220 A decade later, in Black, the
Court applied the method of analysis set out in R.A.V. and found that
banning cross burning with intent to intimidate does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. ~2
When the Court granted certiorari in Black, critics saw an opportunity for the Court to clarify its holding in R.A.V.2 2 Instead, the Black
Court compounded the confusion by over analyzing the Virginia stat-

213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1564 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

216.

Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

217.

Id. at 1568 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

218. Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708 (2000) (upholding restriction on protests
near abortion clinics since the state had a legitimate interest in protecting those attending such facili-

ties "from unwanted advice" and "unwanted communication").
219.

Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003); RA.

(1992).
220.
221.
222.

See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387-9 1.
See Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1541.
Enslin, supra note 91, at 199.

v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
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ute. 223 Further, the Black Court erred in distinguishing the Virginia statute from the statute in R.A. V. 22 Similar to the R.A. V. statute, the Virginia
cross-burning statute constituted viewpoint discrimination which made it
unconstitutional.2 25 Thus, the Black Court's opinion, while engaging to
proponents of cross-burning regulation, only confounded First Amendment analysis and established precedent that severely undermines free
speech.
A. A Confusing Method of Analysis
The primary shortcoming of the Black decision was the Court's
analysis of viewpoint discrimination based on the Virginia statute. The
Court concluded that the Virginia statute did not discriminate based on
viewpoint and supported its decision by following the analysis previously set out in R.A.V. 226 However, the Court did not follow R.A.V. as
closely as it could have. The Court in Black meant to clarify R.A.V.,227
but instead weakened the prior decision by taking an unnecessary analytical step.
First, the Court suggested that cross burning with intent to intimidate was a type of true threat.228 Second, the Court decided that the statute was viewpoint neutral-that it did not "single out for opprobrium
only that speech directed toward" a disfavored topic. 229 The Court's finding that the statute did not discriminate based on viewpoint should have
ended the analysis under R.A. V. If the regulation did not discriminate on
viewpoint, and cross burning is categorized as low value speech, then
Virginia's statute banning cross burning was constitutional. As the Court
established in R.A. V., if a regulation within a proscribable area of speech,
such as true threats, does not discriminate based on viewpoint, the regu230
lation does not present a First Amendment problem.
However, the Court went on to analyze the Virginia statute under
R.A. V.'s exceptions to the general rule that the government cannot regulate proscribable speech based on viewpoint. 23 1 Because the Court had
already decided that the statute did not limit speech based on viewpoint,
the discussion of the exceptions was unnecessary and superfluous.232
Under the Court's own reasoning in R.A.V., the exceptions are only rele233
vant when a statute does discriminate based on viewpoint. 3 Thus, dis223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548-52.
See id. at 1548-50.
See Smolla, supra note 5, at 569.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548-49.
See id.
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1549.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549-50.
See id.
at 1549.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387-89.
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cussion of the exceptions after already concluding that the Virginia statute was not viewpoint discriminatory only adds confusion to an already
unsettled area of the law. In fact, by applying the R.A. V. exceptions unnecessarily, the Black Court did little to remedy Justice White's prediction that the R.A. V. Court's approach to the First Amendment would only
result in confusion, particularly in the lower courts.234 After Black, it
appears that the R.A.V. decision not only confused lower courts and
commentators, but perhaps even at least six justices of the Supreme
Court as well.
After R.A. V., several states invalidated their cross-burning statutes. 235 The Maryland Court of Appeals declared its cross-burning statute
unconstitutional.236 The Maryland court reasoned that because the statute
prohibited cross burning as opposed to other types of burnings, it discriminated based on content.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a previous decision and determined that the state's cross-burning
statute violated the First Amendment.23 8 However, as Justice White had
predicted, not all states agreed on what the R.A. V. decision meant. Florida, for example, upheld its cross-burning statute, explaining that the
statute was content neutral and prohibited only "threats of violence. 2 39
The Court further confused the issue of what is important in First
Amendment analysis in its Black decision. The lack of a clear method of
analysis threatens the First Amendment by increasing the likelihood that
courts will make inconsistent decisions.2 4° Under R.A.V., the Court provided two ways for states to regulate cross burning. First, states may
regulate cross burning as a true threat, provided the regulation is not
viewpoint discriminatory. 24' Second, even if a cross-burning regulation
appears to be viewpoint-based, regulations still may be constitutional if:
(1) the reason for the viewpoint discrimination is the same as the reason
the entire category is procribable; or (2) the regulation focuses on the
secondary effects of the speech. 242 While proponents of cross-burning
regulation may laud the Black Court's conclusion, the decision is
unlikely to lead to positive results in future cases because First Amendment analysis is now even more unclear than after R.A.V. It is important
to note that the outcome of Black would have been the same even if the
Court had followed its R.A. V. analysis more closely. The Court determined that the statute did not present a First Amendment problem before
234.
235.
land, and
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 415 (White, J.,
concurring).
Enslin, supra note 91, at 193-94 (noting that since the R.A.V. decision, Virginia, MarySouth Carolina have struck down their cross-burning statutes).
State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753, 763 (Md. 1993).
Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 759-60.
State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514-16 (S.C. 1993).
State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 482 (Fa. 1995).
See Enslin, supra note 91, at 194-95.
Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48.
These exceptions were set out in R.A. V. See discussion supra notes 58-66.
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taking the extra analytical step.24 3 That step was, therefore, an unnecessary and confusing alternative basis for finding Virginia's statute constitutional. However, beyond the mere results, the Black Court's confusion
of analysis undermines the First Amendment and will likely have a negative effect on future cases that, unlike Black, lack an attractive outcome
to a difficult constitutional problem.
B. The Statutes Are Indistinguishable
In addition to confusing First Amendment analysis, the Black Court
also failed to recognize that the Virginia statute, like the ordinance in
R.A. V., was implicitly viewpoint discriminatory. 244 Like the R.A. V. ordinance, the Court should have found the Virginia statute to discriminate
on viewpoint because cross-burning regulations single out the white supremacist viewpoint.24 5 In short, the regulations at issue in R.A.V. and
Black are indistinguishable.
States have a legitimate interest in banning cross burning because
burning a cross is a "symbol of hate. 246 Few would object, it seems, to
making cross burning illegal. However, such laws raise constitutional
problems.24 7 Most importantly, such laws are likely to violate the First
Amendment because cross burning almost always carries a message and,
therefore, is a form of expression-symbolic speech.248 The fact that
cross burning is carried out to promote white supremacy and embodies a
message of hate does not give the government an unfettered right to ban
the burning of a cross. 249 As Rodney Smolla, law professor and Bill of
Rights expert, said of cross-burning bans, "the ends are admirable but the
means unconstitutional. 2 5 0
The Court should have found the Virginia statute unconstitutional
because it singled out the white supremacist viewpoint.25 ' In R.A.V. the
St. Paul ordinance was invalidated because it singled out particular
viewpoints.252 Conversely, in Black, the Court found that, unlike the
R.A. V. ordinance, which singled out symbols that aroused fear based on
"race, color, creed, religion or gender," the Virginia statute did not discriminate among viewpoints because it did not regulate cross burnings
done only for religious or racial reasons but banned all cross burnings
243. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549-5 1.
244. See id. at 154 1.
245. See Smolla, supra note 5, at 566.
246. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.753, 771 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
247. See Smolla, supra note 5, at 566.
248.

See id.

249. See id.
250. Id. at 570.
Although cross burning is used to threaten groups for reasons other than race, history
251.
suggests that the major message associated with such conduct is one of white supremacy. See, e.g.,
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1544.
252. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
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done with intent to intimidate.253 The Court supported its view that banning cross burning does not favor a viewpoint reasoning that, "as a factual matter," cross burners do not direct their conduct only toward racial
or religious minorities.254
The Court failed to recognize the inherent link between cross burning and promotion of white supremacy. Banning cross burning is comparable to banning symbols of white supremacy. The Court's own description of the history of cross burning in the United States suggests this very
fact.255 Although the Virginia statute did not specifically distinguish between crosses burned for racial reasons and crosses burned for religious
reasons in its text, the statute did not have to do so to be unconstitutional. 56 The Virginia statute, like the R.A.V. ordinance, was thinly
veiled viewpoint discrimination and, therefore, was a violation of the
First Amendment.257
C. Solutions
In the United States, a burning cross has been a symbol of white supremacy and an expression of hate for most of the last century. 8 Because of this undeniable history, cross-burning laws admittedly serve a
noble purpose-to protect individuals and groups from a very real fear of
violence.2 59 However, banning cross burning presents a dilemma. On one
hand, society is well served by punishing those who place burning
crosses on the lawns of their neighbors with messages of hate and intimidation. On the other hand, society is well served by the preservation of
freedom of expression. The question of whether to allow the government
to punish cross burning is impossible to answer without harming society
in some way. In the end, although regulation seems right, the expense is
too great.
Two solutions have been offered to punish cross burning without infringing on freedom of expression. In fact, both solutions avoid the First
Amendment issue altogether. The first, offered by scholars and the
Court, is to punish cross burning through existing laws. 26 The second,
offered by Justice Thomas, is to characterize cross burning as conduct

253.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1548-49 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 290.02 (1990)).
254.
Id. at 1549.
255.
See id. at 1544-46.
256.
See id. at 1559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Smolla,
supra note 5, at 566 ("In my estimation no cross-burning law ... will ever escape the viewpointdiscrimination problem.., simply and completely because it is a cross-burning law.").
257.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258.
See id. at 1544-46; see also supra Part lI.B.
259.
See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 5, at 568 (stating that "any American with even a passing
sense of our national history knows that cross burning is a ritual strongly associated with bigotry and
violence").
260.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.

20031

SHORTCOMINGS OF VIRGINIA V. BLACK

rather than speech.2 6' Although both solutions seem to preserve freedom
of expression, as we will see, the first is more workable than the second.
1. Use Existing Laws
One way to protect citizens from the terrible fear cross burning instills, while preserving freedom of speech, is to abolish all laws specifically banning cross burning and punish those who maliciously burn
crosses under existing laws.262 For example, a law against burning objects on the property of another with intent to intimidate would have the
same legal effect as a specific cross-burning statute, without the First
Amendment problem.

263

Such a law would catch within its net all those

who burn crosses on the lawns of their neighbors as a threat. Likewise, it
would leave well alone those who burn crosses at rallies on private property.
Law professor Rodney Smolla suggests combating cross burning
with laws such as "breach of peace," "communication of threats," or
"incitement to lawless action." 264 Moreover, it seems the Supreme Court,
at least in R.A.V., supports the idea of punishing cross burning under
existing laws. 265 The R.A.V. Court explicitly noted that the individual
who burned a cross in that case might have been punished under "any of
a number of laws ....

The Court specifically mentioned laws against

threats, arson, and property damage. 267

The Virginia Supreme Court also recognized other laws under
which the defendants could have been punished: "Neutrally expressed
statutes prohibiting vandalism, assault, and trespass may have vitality for
the prosecution of particularly offensive conduct." 268 Additionally, Justice Souter argued, in Black, that a statute banning intimidation would
satisfy the same goal without infringing on the First Amendment rights
of the speaker.269
The downfall of this simple solution is that alternative laws may not
carry the weight of specific cross-burning laws, and arguably, cross burning victims deserve to have laws that punish hate speech specifically.
However, the existing laws are not necessarily weaker. For example,
under the Virginia statute, the three defendants were sentenced to ninety

Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
261.
262.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (sug263.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Souter, J.,
gesting that "a content-neutral statute banning intimidation would achieve the same object without
singling out particular content").
264.
Smolla, supra note 5, at 570.
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.
265.
Id.
266.
267.
Id. at 381 n.l.
268.
Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001).
269.
Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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days in jail and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine, 270 However, in R.A. V., the
Court said the defendant could have been punished under a threat statute
carrying a punishment of up to five years in prison, an arson statute with
a penalty of up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine, or a criminal
damage to property law with a penalty of up to one year in prison and a
$3,000 fine .2 7 l Any of these punishments would have been more harsh
than those handed down under the Virginia statute.
2. Classify Cross Burning as Conduct
Justice Thomas's analysis in his Black dissent also avoided the First
Amendment issue.272 Justice Thomas argued that for purposes of the Virginia statute, cross burning is conduct, not speech, and, therefore, not
controlled by the First Amendment.2 73 This solution, similar to the one
suggested above, eliminates the necessity of further First Amendment
analysis. 274 Justice Thomas argued that the legislative intent of the Virginia statute was to end intimidation, not limit expression of white supremacy. 275 He stated that "whatever expressive value cross burning has,
the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct
undertaken by a particular means. 2 76
However, even if this were the legislature's intent, it is impossible
to separate the conduct and expression in an act such as cross burning. 277
Simply adding an intent to intimidate requirement does not filter out expression. 278 When a member of the Ku Klux Klan burns a cross on the
lawn of an African-American family as a warning of future violence, the
messages of intimidation and white supremacy cannot be separated from
the physical act of burning the cross.

279

Therefore, although categorizing

cross burning with intent to intimidate as conduct would avoid the First
Amendment issue, such an approach is misguided.28 °
V. CONCLUSION

In R.A.V., the Court altered First Amendment analysis and was
criticized for rewriting First Amendment law. 28' Following the decision,
lower courts were confused, causing some to invalidate and others to
uphold their individual state cross-burning statutes.282 Although the
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 1543.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 n. 1.
See Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1548 n.2.
Id. at 1548.
See id.
See id.

281.

See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 411 (White, J.,
concurring).

282.

Enslin, supra note 91, at 193-94.
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Court attempted to clarify its R.A.V. ruling in Black, the proper method
of analysis remains unclear. This lack of clarity is likely to further confuse lower courts, thereby weakening the First Amendment.
Additionally, the Court's decision in Black is inconsistent with its
own precedent on viewpoint discrimination. The Court in Black distinguished the Virginia statute from the ordinance in R.A.V., finding that
regulating cross burning is not viewpoint discrimination.28 3 However, the
Black Court clearly recognized the inherent link between cross burning
and white supremacy. 284 This link should have led to the conclusion that
regulating cross burning is a regulation of the white supremacist viewpoint and a violation of the First Amendment.
Several obstacles prevent efficient punishment of cross burning and
threaten the protection of the First Amendment. However, by punishing
cross burning under existing laws, courts can regulate cross burning
without threatening freedom of speech. This alternative is a balance between the right of freedom of speech and the right of individuals to live
without fear of violence. The balance is delicate. Those who burn crosses
with intent to intimidate tip the scale in favor of limiting expression,
while those who do the same act without such intent tip the scale toward
protecting expression. The question of whether to allow the government
to punish cross burning is impossible to answer without harming society
in some way. In the end, although regulation seems right, the expense is
too great.
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